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ABSTRACT 
Upward expectations of future electric vehicle (EV) growth pose the question about the future 
load on the electricity grid. While the literature on demand side management of EV charging has 
focused on technical aspects and considered EV-owners as utility maximizers, this study looks at 
the neglected psychological dynamics of EV-owners facing charging decisions and interacting 
with the supplier. This study represents these dynamics by proposing a behavioral framework of 
utility maximization under myopic loss aversion within an ultimatum two-player game 
framework. The EV-owner and the electricity supplier are the two players, the EV-owner faces 
three decisions (i.e., whether to postpone the charging to off-peak periods, which discount to 
request to the supplier for off-peak charging, which discount to accept for supplier-controlled 
charging), and there are two contract durations where the EV-owner decides daily (short-term) or 
weekly (long-term). The experimental analysis included six treatment conditions from the 
combinations of the three decisions with the two contract durations, and results showed that: (i) 
EV-owners perform charging choices not as pure utility maximizers, but are affected by myopic 
loss aversion resulting from monetary considerations as well as the ultimatum game with the 
supplier; (ii) EV-owners are open towards centralized smart-grid strategies optimizing the load 
on the grid from a system optimum perspective; (iii) the frequency of charging decisions (daily 
versus weekly contract) favors on the one hand utility maximization behavior of EV-owners and 
induces on the other hand myopia with a favorable cost minimization for the supplier.     
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INTRODUCTION 
While the market penetration of electric vehicles (EVs), including battery electric vehicles 
(BEVs), plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs), and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs), has been 
negligible so far because of high unit costs, limited driving range, and lack of recharging 
infrastructure, upward expectations exist for a future rapid EV growth following battery 
technology innovation and governmental commitment to EV promotion through investments, 
legislation, and taxation policies (e.g., 1, 2). While studies predict market shares around 4%-10% 
for BEVs and PHEVs by 2020 as reasonable (e.g., 2, 3, 4), demand assessments suggest 
dominant market shares for EVs and PHEVs by 2030-2050 in both Europe and the U.S. (e.g., 4, 
5, 6, 7). In Denmark, the future demand for EVs is estimated between 48% and 72% for new car 
buyers (5). In Belgium, a market share of 44% for BEVs and PHEVs could be attained by 2030 
(4). In Iceland, EVs are expected to achieve between 48% and 93% of the total vehicle fleet by 
2030 (6). In the U.S., EVs are estimated to achieve a market share exceeding 20% by 2030 and 
reaching 70%-80% by 2050 (7).  
The future EV growth is expected to significantly load the electricity power grid. Even 
modest EV shares (20-25% of the total vehicle fleet) are expected to increase the electricity load 
by roughly 30% (8). Home EV charging is very important for the demand side management 
(DSM) of the electricity load, because both home charging availability relates to a higher 
likelihood of EV purchase and charging times occur off-peak overnight (7). Nevertheless, a 
major challenge in home EV charging is the scheduling to avoid congestion on the electricity 
grid. A recent survey in California has in fact showed that most EV charging is likely to start at 
7pm during weekdays, namely during the seasonal peak electricity demand period (9). DSM of 
EV charging in a smart grid by encouraging EV-owners to change their charging patterns in 
response to changes in the electricity prices is viewed as a possible solution to avoid grid 
overload at demand peak hours and to delay the need for investments in increasing the grid 
capacity (10). 
An ample body of research has addressed DSM from the economic and the logistic 
perspective. Economic studies focused on comparing smart and regular grid charging strategies 
while considering potential demand scenarios, centralized versus decentralized supplier 
electricity control, technological solutions for vehicle-to-grid (V2G) communication, time-of-use 
(TOU) pricing schemes and mobility patterns. Economic evaluations showed that cost savings 
for the customers and the suppliers are achieved with smart EV charging: smart charging grids in 
Finland produced benefits of 227 EUR per vehicle per year (11); shifting charging from peak to 
off-peak in the U.S. generated savings ranging from $1.1 billion to $5.1 billion per year (12); 
price-responsive charging strategies in Singapore turned estimated losses of 1000 SGD per 
vehicle per year into estimated profits of 21-130 SGD (13). Logistic studies concentrated on the 
optimization of EV charging from the system perspective while considering TOU pricing 
schemes, mobility patterns, and supplier’s degree of system control, and controlling for 
constraints related to battery storage capacity and penalties for unserved driving needs: agent-
based micro-simulation models estimated electricity prices varying with mobility behavior and 
optimal charging costs (14) and analyzed electricity demand considering EV potential demand 
and price schemes (15); optimization algorithms proposed efficient EV charging scheduling 
under system optimization or user utility maximization (e.g., 16, 17).  
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The major limitation in the aforementioned model lies in their focus being technical 
rather than socio-technical. EV-owners are assumed to be utility maximizers when facing long-
term charging decisions, without stated-preference (SP) or revealed-preference (RP) surveys 
supporting this assumption. Psychological dynamics of EV-owners facing short-term versus 
long-term charging decisions and interacting with the supplier are neglected, as the only 
psychological aspects concern social etiquette (18) and resource replenishing behavior (19). This 
study contributes to the body-of-knowledge concerning EV charging by addressing these 
dynamics that are relevant to the DSM contract selection and, as the results show, are 
fundamental to the development of realistic agent-based and optimization models not affected by 
common psychological biases. This study addresses three key decisions by EV-owners: (i) 
whether to postpone the charging to off-peak periods; (ii) which discount to request to the 
supplier for off-peak charging; (iii) which discount to accept for supplier-controlled charging 
instead of own volitional control. Moreover, this study considers these decisions within two 
contract durations: (i) a daily contract where EV-owners may adapt their charging decision on 
the basis of immediate off-peak mobility needs; (ii) a weekly contract where EV-owners make a 
charging decision for a fixed time period. In a user-controlled system, EV-owners feel volitional 
control and a user utility maximization solution is obtained, while in a supplier-controlled system 
a system optimum solution can be reached. Accordingly, the contract selection requires 
bargaining between EV-owner and supplier, during which the EV-owner considers satisfaction 
related to volitional control, possible discounts proposed for off-peak charging, ability to reach 
an agreement based on the supplier’s acceptance of the discount, and potential losses for 
unforeseen mobility needs during off-peak periods.  
With the intention to represent EV-owners’ charging decisions under these conditions, 
this study presents a novel behavioral framework of utility maximization under myopic loss 
aversion (MLA) in the context of an ultimatum game (UG). MLA combines the two concepts of 
loss aversion and mental accounting that lead individuals to risk averse behavior in short-term 
decisions (20). A UG is a sequential bargaining zero-sum game between two players (the 
proposer and the responder) bargaining over sharing a sum of money: the proposer presents a 
proposal about the sharing of the money, and the responder accepts or rejects the proposed shares 
(21). The behavioral framework leads to empirical stated-preference experiments covering six 
treatment conditions from the combinations of the three decisions with the two contract durations 
and verifying the manifestation of myopic behavior related to either the evaluation of the 
monetary gains or the participation in the bargaining. The novelty of the behavioral framework is 
not restricted to EV charging decisions: (i) while previous studies on MLA considered a single 
individual, this is the first study exploring MLA within a two-player UG and hence investigating 
MLA as related not only to the individual’s gains or losses, but also to the individual’s 
cautiousness in the proposal because of the need to consider the responder’s strategy (22); (ii) 
while previous studies on MLA considered only monetary decisions, this is the first study 
researching MLA for time-based decisions and hence looking into mental accounting for time as 
possibly similar to the one for money (23). 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the proposed behavioral 
framework. The following sections introduce the experimental design and illustrate the results of 
the three experiments on EV charging decisions. The last section draws conclusions and suggests 
policy implications. 
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BEHAVIORAL FRAMEWORK 
This study proposes a novel behavioral framework involving utility maximization under MLA in 
the context of a UG.  
MLA combines the two concepts of loss aversion and mental accounting, where loss 
aversion is the tendency of individuals to be more sensitive to losses than gains and mental 
accounting is the cognitive activity that individuals perform to evaluate alternatives and take 
decisions (20). In the literature, MLA refers typically to the way individuals evaluate a sequence 
of long-term risky investments that can also be evaluated in the short-term (20, 24): myopic 
individuals evaluate the investments independently and reject them if each risky investment is 
separately unattractive, while non-myopic individuals evaluate the sequence in its entirety and 
reject the investments only if the aggregated net return is unattractive (24). Accordingly, MLA 
implies that individuals reach different decisions according to the problem framing. Lessening 
MLA requires limiting evaluation frequency (i.e., the time horizon for investment evaluation) 
and increasing decision flexibility (i.e., the individual has more ability to adjust the decision).  
A UG is a sequential bargaining zero-sum game where the proposer and the responder are 
two players who bargain on sharing a sum of money: the proposer decides how the money is 
shared between the two players, and the responder decides to accept or reject the proposed shares 
(21). Accepting implies that each player earns the agreed share, while rejecting entails no 
earnings for both players. The classical game theory prediction for the bargaining equilibrium 
solution is that the responder accepts any positive share, regardless of its amount, since this 
positive share is better than the zero earning associated to the rejection (ceteris paribus), while 
the proposer expects the responder to act as a rational utility maximizer by offering the smallest 
positive share. The actual observation of empirical evidence suggests that the amounts proposed 
and rejected are affected by additional factors such as emotions, feeling of fairness, sense of 
punishment, sense of reciprocity and, to a lesser extent, demographic and cultural variables (e.g., 
25, 26).  
Consider an individual facing the decision between a first option having cost c at time t 
and a second option having cost (c – g) at time (t + Δt), and hence having a potential gain g from 
the second option. The gain is potential because the individual is the proposer in a UG where the 
other player (the responder) earns the cost paid: the individual proposes a value g for choosing 
the second option, and the responder decides whether to accept or reject the proposal. From the 
proposer perspective, the acceptance implies a cost (c – g) and hence a gain g, while the rejection 
entails no gain and a default saving s. From the responder perspective, the acceptance implies 
lower revenue by the amount g with respect to the rejection. Given the UG, the individual faces 
two decisions: (i) whether to present the proposal to the responder; (ii) if presenting the proposal, 
which amount g to propose. Thus, the individual perceives two contrasting motivations towards 
proposing on the one hand a higher amount, as a higher proposal implies a higher expected gain, 
and on the other hand a lower amount, as a higher proposal entails also a lower acceptance 
probability θ of the responder. Moreover, in the case the responder accepts and the individual 
postpones the decision by Δt, a probability α exists that an unforeseen event occurs at an extra 
cost e equal to (g + s) for the individual.  
Accordingly, there are four possible outcomes from the decision of the individual to 
present the proposal, the decision of the individual about the amount g, the acceptance 
probability θ of the responder, and the occurrence probability α of an unforeseen event:  
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 the individual does not present the proposal, and hence experiences cost c and default 
saving s at time t; 
 the individual proposes an amount g that is rejected by the responder, and hence 
experiences cost c and default saving s at time t; 
 the individual proposes an amount g that is accepted by the responder and no unforeseen 
occurs, and hence experiences cost (c – g) and extra saving g at time (t + Δt); 
 the individual proposes an amount g that is accepted by the responder but an unforeseen 
event occurs, and hence experiences cost (c – g + e) and no saving at time (t + Δt). 
The behavioral framework assumes that the individual maximizes the utility U(g): 
      1 1U g g s e g               (1) 
where the first term represents the utility from the gain g given the responder acceptance of the 
proposal and the non-occurrence of the unforeseen event, the second term represents the utility 
from the saving given the responder rejection of the proposal, and the third term represents the 
disutility (hence the negative sign) from the extra cost for the occurrence of the unforeseen event.  
The acceptance probability θ of the responder depends on the amount g proposed by the 
individual and it is assumed without loss of generality to have a uniform distribution: 
0
0
for g c
c g
for g c
c



 
 
        (2) 
Intuitively, the probability θ is inversely related to the proposed amount g in its being higher for 
lower values of g, it is equal to 0 when the proposed amount g is equal or higher than the cost c, 
since the responder will never accept not to earn anything, and it is equal to 1 when the proposed 
amount g is equal to 0, since the responder will always accept to earn the full cost c. 
Given the expression of the acceptance probability θ, the individual maximizes the 
utility:  
    
 
 2
1
11
1 1
c g g c g
U g g s e g
c c c
s e
g g e
c c
 


 
    
  
      
 
      (3) 
Notably, this expression shows the trade-off for the individual facing the decisions of presenting 
the proposal and eventually choosing the amount g: the incentive for the individual to demand a 
higher amount g in order to maximize the utility is compensated by the higher chance of 
rejection of the proposed amount. 
Consider now that the individual repeats N decisions and might exhibit myopic loss 
averse behavior possibly related to either the evaluation of gains and losses over the N decisions 
or the cautiousness in the bargaining with the responder. Given that the behavioral framework 
represents utility maximizers under MLA within an ultimatum game, there are four boundary 
conditions: (i) non-myopic behavior without UG framework; (ii) non-myopic behavior within the 
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UG framework; (iii) myopic behavior without UG framework; (iv) myopic behavior within the 
UG framework. 
The first boundary condition implies that the individual has a degree of loss aversion λ 
(24) and the responder accepts any proposed amount g (θ = 1). Accordingly, the individual 
maximizes the utility: 
        1 1U g g e g g e                    (4) 
The non-myopic individual maximizes the utility by proposing always the maximum possible g 
equal to c, and is indifferent for g equal to (1 - α)eλ / (α + λ - αλ). 
 The second boundary condition differentiates from the first only in generalizing the 
expression of the probability θ, thus the individual maximizes the utility: 
    
   
 2
1
1
1
c g g c g
U g g s e g
c c c
s e
g g e
c c
  
    
    
 
    
    
       
 
   (5) 
Notably, the utility formulation implies that the higher is the degree of loss aversion λ, the lower 
is the expected maximized value of the utility function, ceteris paribus, since the loss aversion 
affects only the disutility from the occurrence of the unforeseen event.  
 The third boundary condition entails that the individual has a myopic behavior and the 
responder accepts any proposed amount g (θ = 1). Considering each occurrence v of the 
unplanned event over the N decisions, the individual maximizes the utility: 
     
0
[ 1 ( ) ( ) ]
N
vN v
v
U g a N v g v e g 

          (6) 
where the parameter β corresponds to the degree of loss aversion λ if (N – v)g – v(e – g) < 0, and 
1 otherwise.  
 The fourth boundary condition corresponds to the most generic expression where not 
only the individual has a myopic behavior, but he also participates to the UG, thus maximizing 
the utility: 
     
0
[ 1 ( ) ( ) ]
N
vN v
v
c g Ngs
U g a N v g v e g
c c
 

 
      
 
    (7) 
Last, the behavioral framework differentiates between proposer-controlled and 
responder-controlled environments. In the former environment, the individual has full 
information and control over the two options, and the probabilities θ and α represent respectively 
the aforementioned acceptance probability of the responder and the occurrence probability of the 
unforeseen event. Accordingly, it is possible to interpret the behavior of the individual as risk 
averse, neutral or prone. In the latter environment, the individual is aware of the first option, but 
the responder controls the second option in terms of time Δt and cost (c – g). Accordingly, it is 
possible to interpret the behavior of the individual as ambiguity averse, neutral, or prone, as the 
probability θ represent the value of letting the control to the responder rather than selecting the 
only known option. 
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EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
The experimental analysis focused on testing the proposed behavioral framework in the context 
of EV charging decisions. Specifically, the underlying hypothesis was that EV-owners are not 
purely utility maximizers, but they are utility maximizers under MLA within a UG framework: 
the EV-owner is the proposer who faces N decisions about postponing the charging from the 
peak hour t to the off-peak hour (t + Δt) and proposing a discount g on the charging cost c to the 
responder; the electricity supplier is the responder with probability θ of accepting the discount g; 
an unplanned trip occurring before the completion of the postponed charging is the unforeseen 
event with probability α of occurring and extra cost e for a taxi.   
Experimental design 
The experiment was conducted with the Z-tree program (27) at the Centre for Experimental 
Economics (CEE) of the University of Copenhagen among a sample of 147 individuals recruited 
within the CEE registered panel. In terms of socio-demographics, 42.2% of the participants were 
women, the average age was 26.7 years, and the average monthly income was 1430 USD. In 
terms of education, 25.9% of the participants had a Bachelor degree and 66.7% had a Master 
degree. In terms of employment, 21.1% of the participants were unemployed, 38.1% were 
students, 29.9% were students with also an employment, and 10.9% were employees. The 
participants had previously participated in 2.8 experiments on average.  
An SP experiment was designed to investigate utility maximization under MLA within a 
UG framework. Since SP experiments are susceptible of incentive compatibility bias associated 
to respondents not bearing the consequences of their choices, and since associating hypothetical 
decisions with actual transactions is known to mitigate this bias (28), the experiment involved 
actual monetary gains for the participants according to their decisions. Participants earned tokens 
during the experiment and converted them to cash after its conclusion. They were informed that 
the compensation would vary between 10 USD, representing a show up fee, and 87 USD, 
representing the total possible earnings from optimal choices. Participants actually earned 
between 17 and 51 USD for an average earning of 28 USD in an average duration of 50 min, 
above the hourly wage for a student job varying between 20 and 24 USD. 
Participants were instructed to assume to be EV-owners with home EV charging 
availability and battery charging time equal to 2 hours. Socio-demographic information was 
collected, but they were given the same income (110 tokens per day) and mobility pattern in 
order to avoid biases deriving from heterogeneity in value-of-time and travel activity during peak 
and off-peak hours. Participants were informed that the car battery empties every day at 6pm 
when they return home from their mandatory and non-mandatory daily activities, and requires 
charging before the next mandatory trip the following day at 9am.  
Participants faced the decision about whether to pay the amount c for EV charging at 
time t (6pm) or requesting a discount g to the supplier for postponing the charging by Δt, given 
that the electricity price depends on the charging hour. Participants entered a UG that was set up 
by allowing for the probability θ that the supplier accepts the discount g for postponing the EV 
charging to off-peak hours and hence reducing the grid load, and setting the acceptance or 
rejection of the amount g and time Δt by the supplier to be compared against randomly drawn 
threshold values. Participants were informed that, in the case that the supplier agrees with 
postponing the EV charging, there is a probability α that an unplanned trip will occur before the 
charging is completed and hence they will have to pay an extra cost e for a taxi ride. The 
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participants were also informed about general conditions: the supplier does not influence the 
occurrence probability α of the unplanned trip; charging days are independent and hence both 
probabilities θ and α do not depend from previous decisions of the same participant as well as 
decisions of other participants; daily earnings are independent and hence outcomes are 
unaffected by the ones of the same participants in previous days as well as the ones of other 
participants; decisions are taken individually with participants unaware of the decisions of their 
peers.   
Each participant took part in one of six treatment conditions resulting from the 
combinations of three decisions and two contract durations (24-25 participants per condition). 
The assignment to the treatments was completely randomized. The three decisions concerned (i) 
the willingness to postpone the charging time, (ii) the discount asked to the supplier for 
postponing the charging, and (iii) the willingness to accept supplier-controlled charging. The two 
contract durations were (i) daily, where the participants performed 24 decisions representing 24 
charging days, and (ii) weekly, where the participants performed only 3 decisions over the 24 
charging days (i.e., on days 1, 9 and 17) and each decision was valid for the next 8 charging 
days. The two contract durations were deemed suitable to elicit myopic versus non-myopic 
behavior because habitually MLA is tested for 1-day versus 3-day rounds (29). The information 
about the outcome and the corresponding daily earnings was different according to the contract: 
(i) 24 daily rounds were sent to participants in the daily contracts; (ii) both 3 weekly and 24 daily 
rounds were sent to participants in the weekly contract. Before starting the experiment, 
participants answered four control questions to make sure that the level of understanding of the 
experiment was uniform, and clarifications were given to the small minority not answering 
correctly to these questions.  
Experiment 1: Willingness to postpone the charging time 
Procedure 
Participants were requested to choose between charging upon arrival home at the peak hour t 
(6pm) or postponing the charging to off-peak hour (t + Δt). Charging at peak hour t costs c equal 
to 100 tokens (default saving s equal to 10 tokens), but it is risk-free because the supplier always 
accepts its maximum revenue and there is no possibility of unplanned trip. Postponing the 
charging to off-peak hour (t + Δt) costs (c – g) where the discount g is always 25 tokens 
regardless of the time Δt, and it is risky because the supplier may reject the proposal since the 
discount is available only in certain hours randomly selected by the supplier from a uniform 
distribution. A random number was drawn to simulate the acceptance or rejection by the 
supplier: if rejected, the participant was required to pay full price c and recharge at 6pm; if 
accepted, the occurrence probability α of an unplanned trip existed. The probability depends on 
the charging hour, with the occurrence risk increasing linearly by 2% every 15 minutes. 
Participants were fully informed about the occurrence probability α of an unplanned trip prior to 
making the decision and about the taxi fee being e equal to 35 tokens (i.e., the discount g plus the 
saving s). A random number, independent from the previous one, was drawn to simulate the 
occurrence or not of the unplanned trip. 
In this first experiment, the longer the participants postponed the charging hour, the more 
likely they were going to obtain the discount g in the negotiation with the supplier, but also the 
more likely they were going to need a taxi because of the higher occurrence probability of an 
unplanned trip. This experiment was administered to two groups with daily and weekly contract 
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conditions. Notably, in time-based decisions where respondents are asked to choose between a 
smaller immediate reward (i.e., the saving s of 10 tokens for immediate charging) or a larger 
delayed reward (i.e., the saving (g + s) of 35 tokens for postponed charging), a temporal 
discounting bias may lead to choosing the immediate reward (30). With the aim of lessening this 
bias and avoid temporal discounting, all the participants received their cash payments only at the 
end of the experiment.  
Results  
Table 1 presents the results of the experiment for the two contract conditions. Overall, results 
illustrate willingness to postpone the EV charging in order to obtain the proposed discount of 
25% while risking losses because of a possible unplanned trip before the charging was 
completed. Peak hour charging, corresponding to a sure saving of 10 tokens and zero probability 
of an unplanned trip, was chosen only in 63 days (5.7% of the charging days). 
TABLE 1  Willingness to Postpone the EV Charging Time  
 
Average charging hour including  
the risk-free option  
(average acceptable risk of an unplanned trip) 
Share of days with the risk-
free option of charging at 
6pm for a fee of 100 tokens 
Money earned 
Round 
Daily 
contract 
Weekly 
Contract 
Mann-
Whitney test 
 
Daily 
contract 
Weekly 
Contract 
Daily 
contract 
Weekly 
Contract 
1 
22:12 
(37.8%) 
22.07 
(33.8%) 
Z=0.596 18.2% 8.3% 14.0 18.0 
1-8 
11:42 
(46.2%) 
22:07 
(33.8%) 
Z=6.452 
***
 5.1% 8.3% 13.0 14.5 
9-16 
11:56 
(47.5%) 
23:10 
(41.4%) 
Z=2.382 
**
 1.7% 8.3% 13.0 14.0 
17-24 
11:54 
(47.2%) 
23:32 
(44.3%) 
Z=0.456 1.7% 8.3% 11.7 11.7 
all 
11:50 
(47.0%) 
22:56 
(40.0%) 
Z=5.670 
***
 3.0% 8.3% 12.5 13.3 
Note:
*
significant at the 0.10 significance level, 
**
significant at the 0.05 significance level, 
***
significant at the 0.01 
significance level. 
In this first experiment, the supplier’s acceptance rate depends on the EV-owner’s risk 
level. Utility maximization disregarding myopia and the “cautious player” property would lead 
to postponing the charging to 10.30pm, corresponding to a 27.8% risk of an unplanned trip and a 
27.8% supplier’s acceptance probability. Compared with utility maximization, the participants 
reflect a “cautious player” behavior, namely risk aversion to the possibility that the supplier 
might reject the proposal, which turns in risk proneness to the unplanned trip. Participants tried 
to be eligible for discount by postponing EV charging to a later hour while assuming higher risk 
of an unplanned trip. Compared to participants in weekly contracts, the participants in daily 
contracts showed myopia in taking higher risk aversion towards supplier rejection by both 
postponing more trips to off-peak hours and selecting later hours for EV charging. The total 
average gain of the daily contract is 305.20 tokens, versus 323.27 tokens for the weekly contract 
and 323.33 tokens for the optimal utility maximizer. These results suggest that participants in 
weekly contracts approximate utility maximization, while myopic participants in daily contracts 
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have sub-optimal behavior from their perspective, although favorable outcomes from the grid 
load perspective.   
Experiment 2: Acceptable discount for postponing the charging time  
Procedure 
Participants were requested to select the amount g for postponing the EV charging from the peak 
hour t (6pm) to the off-peak hour (t + Δt). As in the first experiment, charging at peak hour t 
costs c equal to 100 tokens and it is risk-free because the supplier always accepts its maximum 
revenue and there is no possibility of unplanned trip. In this second experiment, the off-peak 
hour (t + Δt) is always 11pm and the discount g is variable, hence the cost (c – g) depends on the 
decision of the participant.  
Off-peak charging bears two risks. The first risk is the rejection by the supplier who sets 
a random maximum value in order for the participant to be eligible for a discount. A random 
number was drawn to simulate whether the proposed g was lower or equal to the supplier’s 
threshold and hence the discount was accepted by the supplier, with saving (g + s) for the 
participant from the postponed charging. If the discount was rejected, the participant was 
required to pay full price c and recharge at 6pm. The second risk is the occurrence of an 
unplanned trip before the EV charging is completed that participants were informed to have 
probability α equal to 66.67% and cost e equal to 35 tokens. Notably, the occurrence probability 
α does not depend on the supplier, the proposed discount g, or the decisions of the other 
participants. A random draw, independent from the previous one, was drawn to simulate the 
occurrence or not of the unplanned trip. This experiment was administered to two groups with 
daily and weekly contract conditions. 
Results  
Table 2 presents the results of the experiment for the two contract conditions. Overall, results 
show willingness to postpone the EV charging to 11pm in exchange for a monetary gain while 
risking losses because of a 66.67% probability of occurrence of an unplanned trip before the EV 
was recharged. Peak hour charging was chosen only in 145 days (11.0% of the total charging 
days), although guaranteeing a saving s of 10 tokens and no risk of unplanned trip. The share of 
risk-free choices is higher in this second experiment than in the first. Also, although in the first 
experiment participants were willing to postpone the charging to 12am in the daily contract and 
to 11pm in the weekly contract for a discount equal to 25% of the charging fee, in this second 
experiment participants demanded a greater discount for their willingness to postpone the 
charging to 11pm. Given the random assignment of participants to the treatments and the same 
income and activity pattern, there is no reason for a systematic difference in the participants, and 
hence these findings suggest that either the participants assigned value to the perceived 
behavioral control over their choices or they were affected significantly by the probability of the 
unplanned trip. Given that participants agreed to supplier-controlled charging in the third 
experiment, the second reason seems more likely, also because in the first one the average risk of 
unplanned trip was assumed to be less than 50%, while the average risk was 66.67% in the 
second one. Aversion to high risk of unplanned trip might have led not only to a higher share of 
risk-free choices, but also a higher amount g for postponing to the same or earlier charging than 
in the first experiment, thus suggesting the importance of EV availability for mobility needs. 
Gebeyehu M. Fetene, Sigal Kaplan, Alexander C. Sebald, and Carlo G. Prato 12 
Compared to participants in weekly contracts, participants in daily contracts reflect a 
“cautious player” behavior in choosing the risk-free option in a higher share of days and being 
risk averse to the possibility that the supplier might reject their proposal. Namely, participants 
tried to be eligible for discount by requesting lower amounts for postponing their charging while 
assuming a 66.67% risk of an unplanned trip. The total average gain of the daily contract is 
264.50 tokens, compared to 304.50 tokens for the weekly contract and 425.50 tokens for the 
optimal utility maximizer, suggesting a much larger extent of the myopia leading to sub-optimal 
behavior from the EV-owner perspective and cost minimization benefit from the supplier 
perspective.  
TABLE 2 Acceptable Discount for Postponing the Charging Time to 11pm 
 
Average discount requested in tokens 
(including the risk-free option) 
 
Share of days with the risk-
free option of charging at 
6pm for a fee of 100 tokens 
Money earned 
Round 
Daily 
contract 
Weekly 
Contract 
Mann-
Whitney test 
 
Daily 
contract 
Weekly 
Contract 
Daily 
contract 
Weekly 
Contract 
1 38.0 33.8 Z = 0.367 11.1% 17.9% 13.0 14.3 
1-8 36.6 38.5 Z = -0.130 9.3% 17.9% 10.2 12.2 
9-16 34.6 39.7 Z = -2.139 
**
 17.6% 0.0% 10.7 13.2 
17-24 34.7 41.0 Z = -2.640 
***
 18.1% 3.6% 12.2 13.9 
all 35.3 39.7 Z = -2.788 
***
 15.0% 7.1% 11.1 13.1 
Note:*significant at the 0.10 significance level, **significant at the 0.05 significance level, ***significant at the 0.01 
significance level 
Experiment 3:  Acceptable discount for supplier-controlled charging 
Procedure 
Participants were requested to choose the amount g upon agreeing to supplier-controlled 
charging in which the supplier decides the optimal charging hour with the aim of optimizing the 
grid load. Participants could also opt for EV charging at peak hour t at the full cost c equal to 100 
tokens and hence do not experience any risk. Participants were informed that the supplier could 
charge their vehicle at 6pm, 11pm, or 3am, and could decide to let the supplier decide, thus 
reflecting their inconvenience due to the lack of behavioral control and the ambiguity associated 
with the supplier-controlled charging.  
The second option of agreeing to supplier-controlled charging bears two risks. The first 
risk is that the supplier rejects the proposal because the amount g is deemed unprofitable. The 
participants were informed that the supplier sets a random maximum value to be eligible for 
discount, and a random number draw simulated whether the proposed discount g is lower or 
equal to the supplier’s threshold. If it is lower or equal, then the discount is granted and the daily 
earnings are (g + s), otherwise the participants need to charge at 6pm at full price c. The second 
risk is that, when the supplier charges the EV at 11pm or 3am, there is an occurrence probability 
α of an unplanned trip before completion of the charging. This probability α did not depend on 
the supplier, the proposed discount g, or the decisions of other participants, but depended on the 
charging hour (the later is the charging hour, the higher is α). A random draw, independent from 
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the previous one, simulated the occurrence or not of the unplanned trip that implied a taxi fee e 
equal to (g + s) to annul every earning for the day. This experiment was administered to two 
groups with daily and weekly contract conditions. 
Results  
Table 3 presents the results of the third experiment for the two contract conditions. Results 
illustrate the willingness to concede control to the supplier over the scheduling of EV charging in 
exchange for a monetary amount g and hence to agree not to know about the charging hour and 
the probability of an unplanned trip. Peak hour charging was chosen only in 60 days (5.4% of the 
total charging days) regardless of the sure saving s of 10 tokens and the risk-free conditions. 
Practically, the participants were willing to wave their perceived behavioral control and deal with 
an ambiguous and ill-defined EV charging environment where the supplier has complete control. 
Interestingly, the share of risk-free charging days was similar to the first experiment and lower 
than the second one, reflecting the possibility that the participants hypothesized the risk of an 
unplanned trip being lower than 50%.  
Compared with the participants in weekly contracts, participants in daily contracts 
reflected higher “ambiguity aversion” in that they had a higher share of risk-free days and 
demanded higher amounts g for willing to accept an ambiguous supplier-controlled charging 
environment. The “ambiguity aversion” in this third experiment is a more dominant behavioral 
rule over the “cautious player” behavior observed in the previous two experiments. Also, the 
weekly contract produces a favorable outcome in terms of costs assumed by the supplier.  
TABLE 3  Acceptable Discount for Supplier-Controlled Charging 
 Average discount requested in tokens 
Share of days with the risk-
free option of charging at 
6pm for a fee of 100 tokens 
Money earned  
in tokens per round 
Round 
Daily 
contract 
Weekly 
Contract 
Mann-
Whitney test 
 
Daily 
contract 
Weekly 
Contract 
Daily 
contract 
Weekly 
Contract 
1 32.9 32.9 Z = -0.056 10.0% 19.2% 20.5 15.2 
1-8 34.4 32.9 Z = 0.267 5.0% 19.2% 16.9 16.0 
9-16 38.2 38.0 Z = 0.152 5.6% 0.0% 14.5 17.2 
17-24 44.6 39.2 Z = 3.350 
*** 
2.0% 0.0% 19.4 15.1 
All 39.1 36.7 Z = 2.141 
**
 4.2% 6.4% 16.9 16.1 
Note:*significant at the 0.10 significance level, **significant at the 0.05 significance level, ***significant at the 0.01 
significance level 
CONCLUSIONS 
This study proposes a novel behavioral framework representing utility maximization under MLA 
in the context of a two-player UG and presents an application to represent the charging decisions 
of EV-owners. The EV-owners’ charging choice behavior is explored for three stipulated choices 
(willingness to postpone their charging to off-peak hours, requested discount fee for off-peak 
charging, and requested discount fee for accepting supplier-controlled charging) and two contract 
conditions (daily and weekly) by means of an SP experimental analysis.  
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A word of caution is warranted for result interpretation and policy implementation. 
Firstly, this study was conducted in laboratory conditions and although it controlled for incentive 
compatibility and temporal discounting biases, the conditions do not reflect the actual electricity 
costs and mobility needs. Secondly, this study assumes a stylized experimental design with 
population homogeneity in terms of value of time, mobility needs, battery charging preferences, 
car availability and size. Thirdly, this study was conducted with participants without prior 
experience as EV-owners or users, while a recent study shows that EV user experience results in 
attitudinal change in SP choice experiments (31). Last, the decisions in the experiment were 
taken individually and the participants were unaware of the decisions of their peers, while in 
reality word-of-mouth is a powerful market force. Therefore, the results should be viewed as an 
indicative or diagnostic tool rather than a statistical analysis of the prevalence of the identified 
themes across the population of potential EV-owners and cannot be readily extended for the 
purpose of demand analysis.  
Bearing these limitations in mind, this study provides valuable insights for decision-
makers and planners in the transportation and energy fields and these insights may be integrated 
into agent-based and optimization models relying on behavioral rules regarding EV-owners’ 
charging behavior.  
Firstly, the empirical results show high willingness of EV-owners to postpone charging 
hour from peak to off-peak hours as well as to concede control of the charging environment to 
the supplier. This finding indicates consumer openness towards centralized smart-grid strategies 
that can optimize the load on the electricity grid from a system optimum perspective. A discount 
of 25% on the full charging fee is deemed highly attractive for postponing the charging hour to 
off-peak period (between 11pm and 12am) while assuming between 40% and 47% of a risk of an 
unplanned trip with a cost of 35% of the charging fee. The requested discount for a supplier-
controlled environment in which the charging hour and the risk of an unplanned trip are 
unknown to the EV-owner varies between 35% and 40%, which indicates the value of 
inconvenience due to ambiguity.  
Secondly, the empirical results confirm the proposed behavioral model indicating that 
EV-owners take their decisions about EV charging hours according to utility maximization under 
MLA in the context of a UG. This behavior translates into risk aversion because of the MLA and 
the “cautious player” property, as well as the “ambiguity aversion” in the case of ill-defined 
supplier-controlled charging environment. This behavioral model could be considered to 
substitute the unrealistic and yet constantly used utility maximization in future agent-based and 
optimization models aiming at providing the system optimum electricity load.  
Last, the type of contract conditions and hence the frequency of charging decisions (daily 
versus weekly) is related to utility maximization under MLA in the context of a two-player UG 
and can be used to either encourage consumer’s utility maximization or supplier’s cost 
minimization. Participants in the weekly contracts approximate utility maximization (especially 
in the decision to postpone or not the charging), while the myopia of the participants in the daily 
contracts leads to sub-optimal behavior from the EV-owner perspective but also to favorable 
outcomes in terms of grid load from the electricity supplier perspective. Compared to 
participants in weekly contracts, participants in daily contracts were willing to postpone their 
charging to a later off-peak hour and requested lower compensation for postponing their 
charging hour, but in contrast they showed higher ambiguity aversion and requested higher 
compensation for supplier-controlled charging.     
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